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Our judicial system, indeed our entire legal system, was forged in the age of the
common law. Most judges still function in the mold of their common law
predecessors. I have long maintained that Marbury v. Madison' was not so much a
triumph for judicial supremacy as it was a triumph for the processes of the common
law. The "judicial activism" reflected by Marbury and so criticized by today's
conservatives (and yesterday's liberals) is really "judicial naturalism' '-judges doing
what comes naturally-what most of them were taught to do. That is why the crime
of judicial activism is always reputed to be rampant in somebody else's neighbor-
hood. It should not seem remarkable that a "conservative" judge is just as likely to
tease out different meanings from the written word as are "liberal" judges.
In discussing judicial activism, labels are both largely unhelpful and wholly
unavoidable. Before anyone fixes too closely on my labels, I ought to define them.
Perhaps the least useful way to describe a judge is as a "liberal" or as a "conser-
vative." If dictionary definitions of those words are applied, almost all judges are
conservative. Almost all of them think of their jobs as conserving a set of values.
Most judges are very uncomfortable with change of any kind. (If you think this is an
exaggeration, try walking into a courtroom in blue jeans some time.) I don't propose
to use dictionary definitions; I use the words more as the shorthand that the press uses
to describe politicians. To be more precise, I use the words "liberal" and "con-
servative" to distinguish between those federal judges appointed by Presidents Carter
and Kennedy and those appointed by Presidents Reagan and Nixon. If that lumps a
Cornelia Kennedy with a George Edwards or a Justice Harry Blackmun with a Chief
Justice William Rehnquist, it only proves that labels, even as shorthand, are fre-
quently wide of the mark.
"Judicial activism" is another phrase that lacks precision in its use. For
purposes of this essay, I use it to describe the decisional process by which judges fill
in the gaps that they perceive in a statute or the ambiguities that they find in a
constitutional phrase. Under that definition, all judges are activists. How else can a
judge behave when confronted with phrases such as "due process of law" or "cruel
and unusual punishment" from the Constitution or "arbitrary or capricious" from the
Administrative Procedure Act?2
A few politicians (usually not lawyers) yearn wistfully for a system in which
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judges are not required to use judgment. Instead they desire a judiciary that will
merely apply the law or the Constitution as written. Former Attorney General Meese
(who is a lawyer) insisted that even the vaguest constitutional phrases could be
cabined into precision if only the judges would look at the "original intent" of the
framers of the Constitution. Like other observers who either abhor or do not
understand the legislative process-and specifically, the dynamics of finding suitable
words to express a diverse group's general agreement-General Meese assumed the
inestimable. Most legislators, constitutional or otherwise, do not agree on all the
consequences of a legislative result. Many consequences have not been foreseen;
other consequences are fused into a hybrid result where the specific concern is neither
consciously approved nor disapproved. In sum, for most law, there is no original
intent.
Justice William Brennan used a delightful example in his recent Holmes lecture,
delivered at Harvard Law School in 1986. 3 He described the legislative debate
surrounding the eighth amendment to the Constitution. This debate is far more
susceptible to original intent analysis than other constitutional provisions, because
unlike the body of the Constitution which was drafted and debated in secret, the Bill
of Rights was adopted by the First Congress and hence has a relatively complete
legislative history. At the very least, the debate has more legitimacy as a legislative
debate than the political essays which comprise the Federalist Papers or the private
notes of James Madison or others who described events from their perspective. The
phrase "cruel and unusual punishment" was taken from some obscure English
manifesto; it had not been used in any previous statute. An opponent in the First
Congress complained that the language was so vague that it might subsequently be
used to strike down state statutes which ordained "ear-cropping" or "capital
punishment." Since the proponents of the eighth amendment had the votes, nobody
bothered to answer the opponent, and the language was adopted notwithstanding the
ambiguity. While Justice Brennan uses the example to advance his position against
capital punishment, even the most ardent hanging judge would find ear-cropping a
cruel and unusual punishment today. Seeking out the "original intent" of the First
Congress is hardly a useful quest.
I had a similar experience during my congressional career. The infamous RICO4
provisions of federal law5 were adopted as part of the Organized Crime Control Act
of 1970.6 There were fewer than forty of us who opposed it in the House of
Representatives. In an effort to dramatize the ambiguities of the bill, I described the
RICO provisions in the most hyperbolic terms I could imagine. I conjured up a parade
of horribles for my colleagues to contemplate. As in the case of the debate on the
eighth amendment in the First Congress, the proponents had the votes to pass RICO
3. Brennan, Constitutional Adjudication and the Death Penalty: A View From the Court, 100 HAtv. L. REv. 313
(1986).
4. Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations.
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and nobody even bothered to answer my criticism. Much to my chagrin, I am widely
quoted in current lawsuits as proof that Congress intended to give RICO the broad
meaning that has been attributed to it. Had I known then what I know now, I would
have skipped the hyperbole and negotiated a dialogue with my Committee Chairman
to deny the very meanings that have been given to RICO. The Chairman would have
agreed to almost any dialogue that I would have proposed simply to avoid the
acrimony of debate and the possibility that my arguments might have enlarged the
opposition to the bill. Obviously, neither the arguments that I made nor the dialogue
that I might have proposed would have shed any legitimate light on the "original
intent" of the Congress that passed RICO.
What does that say about the legitimacy of the use of legislative history in the
interpretation of statutes? Some judges, past and present, would say that it proves the
silliness of looking at legislative history generally. One of the distinguished former
judges of my court once opined that using legislative history was like "looking over
a crowd and picking out your friends"-every judge could find something or other
to buttress a particular position. 7 Justice Scalia recently took an even less charitable
view, speculating that the purpose of congressional committee reports is "not
primarily to inform the Members of Congress what the bill meant ... but rather to
influence judicial construction." 8
I do not agree that seeking legislative intent is a fool's errand. I think that the
quest is difficult and will never provide the holy grail that General Meese envisioned
would result from the "original intent" crusade. There will still be room for judges
to fill in blanks, with all the attendant dangers and problems that result from unelected
officials making policy choices. But I think that an informed, careful use of
legislative history can limit the number of interstices that judges plug.
Most judges, conservative or liberal, don't aspire to be policymakers; many
deny that they are making policy even when they do fill in the gaps. I have no doubt
that most of us, conservative and liberal, end up making some policy decisions
despite our aspirations or self-analysis. The beginning of a new discipline about the
way judges interpret statutes is to put aside the mindset of our common law
predecessors. We are not supposed to remodel or remold or update or untangle the
statutes of this country. We should not try to do to the statutory tort law what Judge
Cardozo and others did to the tort law in the famous cases we learned about in law
school. That is why suggestions like those of Dean Calabresi to allow judges to
"update" the law and eliminate the obsolete laws are dangerous. 9 The age of statutes
in which we live clearly assigns those tasks elsewhere. If they are not performed, the
solution must be found through elections, not litigations.
Judges ought to look at the "plain meaning" doctrine not as a set of handcuffs
but as the given first rule of our interplay with the legislative branch. I do not view
the plain meaning canon as a conservative invention or a liberal constraint. If the
7. Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative History in the 1981 Supreme Court Term, 68 IowA L. REv.
195, 214 (1983) (quoting a conversation with Judge Harold Leventhal).
8. Blanchard v. Bergeron, 109 S. Ct. 939, 947 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring).
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words are capable of a clear meaning that can be applied to the case at hand, we ought
to look no further. As Judge Leventhal said, one can always find some friends in the
legislative history. Judges ought not tilt the result by looking unnecessarily.
Unfortunately, the plain meaning doctrine does not answer many of the interpretation
disputes that judges are called upon to resolve. For many reasons, including original
sin, legislators do not always speak plainly, and certainly not comprehensively. There
will be numerous occasions in which the judges must look to the legislative history
to decide the cases before them.
Because legislative history must be used in a large number of cases involving
statutory interpretation, one could wish that the users and the makers were on the same
wave length. Judges apply "canons of construction" that legislators never knew (or
have forgotten). Legislators use communication and bargaining techniques that judges
do not know or understand. As an example, judges are quick to turn to the floor debate
to decipher meaning. Seldom is the floor debate the vehicle by which the legislative
branch resolves its wording disputes. Those arguments are much more likely to be
resolved in committee and reflected in the committee report. Nevertheless, some
judges think that the committee report is "unreliable" because it is written by staff
rather than by Members of Congress. Other judges do not think about the committee
report at all. I think it ought to be the first place that judges look to find out what
Congress meant. The enemy is not legislative records-only bad legislative records.
Unfortunately, misuse of legislative history by the courts has led to its
widespread misuse by the Congress. I would wince when my former colleagues
would get up and announce that they took the floor to make some "legislative
history." I wince even more when I read that some of my present colleagues accept
that self-serving exercise as useful to the task of interpreting a statute. For example,
for better or worse, courts created the doctrine of implied remedies to resolve the
dilemma of statutes that set up elaborate protective devices without sufficient
enforcement devices. Individual Members of Congress who failed to convince
Congress to include express language now seize on the opportunity to make some
"legislative history" announcing either the presence or absence of implied remedies
in statutes during legislative debate. Legislators will frequently use the easy access to
the Congressional Record as a device to confuse the plain meaning of a statute.
Judges will frequently get gulled by this device.
Despite these problems, it would be foolish for judges to ignore legislative
objectives or to pretend that original intent is always discernible. Rather we must
bridge the gulf between those who produce legislative history and those who digest
it. Promising efforts are already underway. Robert A. Katzmann and the Brookings
Institution are trying to develop a common language by encouraging more dialogue
between the two branches and describing the functions of each branch in a way that
will inform the other. 10 The task is monumental, however, and will not be accom-
plished easily. Ultimately it may be as difficult as persuading current judges that the
good old common law and the good old common law judges are ancient history.
10. See TnE BROOKINGs INSTITUTION, JUDGES AND LEGIsLATORS ( . Katzman ed.) (1988).
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